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**NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY
SERVICE**



INSPECTOR GENERAL

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

5 June 2015; Revised 28 September 2015

IV-14-0112

Alleged Hostile Work Environment

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Approved for Release by NSA on 20 December 2022, FOIA Case #85643 Litigation

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(U) OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

(U) Chartered by the NSA Director and by statute, the Office of the Inspector General conducts audits, investigations, inspections, and special studies. Its mission is to ensure the integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness of NSA operations, provide intelligence oversight, protect against fraud, waste, and mismanagement of resources by the Agency and its affiliates, and ensure that NSA activities comply with the law. The OIG also serves as an ombudsman, assisting NSA/CSS employees, civilian and military.

(U) AUDITS

(U) The audit function provides independent assessments of programs and organizations. Performance audits evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of entities and programs and their internal controls. Financial audits determine the accuracy of the Agency's financial statements. All audits are conducted in accordance with standards established by the Comptroller General of the United States.

(U) INVESTIGATIONS

(U) The OIG administers a system for receiving complaints (including anonymous tips) about fraud, waste, and mismanagement. Investigations may be undertaken in response to those complaints, at the request of management, as the result of irregularities that surface during inspections and audits, or at the initiative of the Inspector General.

(U) INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT

(U) Intelligence oversight is designed to insure that Agency intelligence functions comply with federal law, executive orders, and DoD and NSA policies. The IO mission is grounded in Executive Order 12333, which establishes broad principles under which IC components must accomplish their missions.

(U) FIELD INSPECTIONS

(U) Inspections are organizational reviews that assess the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency components. The Field Inspections Division also partners with Inspectors General of the Service Cryptologic Elements and other IC entities to jointly inspect consolidated cryptologic facilities.

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I. (U) SUMMARY

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 28 September 2015, following a classification review, the NSA/CSS Office of the Inspector General revised this report, removing a classified statement pertaining to the NSA/CSS [] budget. After removing that statement, the report is correctly classified as UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO. Please destroy previous versions.

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 5 August 2014, the NSA/CSS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) received an allegation regarding the then Director of the NSA/CSS []. The allegation stated that [] created and perpetuated an atmosphere of workforce intimidation within the []. The complainant relayed concerns about [] allegedly unprofessional behavior, including screaming at work, harassing phone calls to employees at home, and an inability to lead effectively. The employee further alleged that there was widespread fear of retribution among the [] workforce for speaking out about these concerns.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) In addition to obtaining sworn testimony from [] the OIG conducted interviews of 21 witnesses.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The OIG did not substantiate the allegation that [] created or perpetuated a hostile work environment or otherwise violated NSA/CSS PMM Chapter 366, section 2-1. [] employees gave mixed testimony to the OIG about [] workplace behavior. Some cited specific instances of [] screaming at individuals, using profanity, or being harshly critical. Some instances were widely known within the [] possibly due to [] position as the Chief. Other witnesses told the OIG that [] style was to speak softly and that she maintained a professional tone even when directly challenged. Though witnesses testified that some [] employees were intimidated by [] that reaction seems more attributable to the tough questions she would ask, her unpredictability, her tendency to put people on the spot, and her propensity to react quickly.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The OIG did find by a preponderance of the evidence, however, at least one incident in which [] did not demonstrate the required courtesy and respect in dealing with fellow workers in violation of PMM Chapter 366:

[] screamed at an employee in front of others, berated him at an extraordinarily high volume. A witness testified to the OIG that [] told the employee he was "fucking crazy." [] told the OIG she used the phrase to refer to a project, not the employee. She admitted to the OIG that, in this instance, she crossed a professional line when she yelled and that she later apologized to the employee.

¹ (U//~~FOUO~~) The initial allegation also mentioned that there was an appearance of financial conflict of interest and cited [] risk aversion. The OIG found insufficient evidence to warrant investigation of the financial conflict of interest and found the allegation of risk aversion to be a management issue.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) A copy of this report will be provided to Employee Relations (MR). A summary memorandum will be provided to the Associate Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence, Special Actions (Q242), and [REDACTED] supervisor.

[REDACTED]
.....
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II. (U) BACKGROUND

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(U) Introduction

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] Defense Intelligence Senior Level, entered on duty with NSA on [redacted].
[redacted] She became the Director [redacted] in March 2013.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In November 2014, [redacted] departed the [redacted] and [redacted].
[redacted] Her employee profile is attached as Appendix B.

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(U) Applicable Authorities

(U//~~FOUO~~) The investigation looked at possible violations of the following authorities.

(U) NSA/CSS PMM Chapter 366, Section 1, 1-3, General Principles for on the Job Conduct.

(U) NSA/CSS PMM, Chapter 366, Section 2, Personnel and Security Standards, 2-1, Work Environment

(U) NSA/CSS Policy 1-37, Annex D: Prohibition of Harassment

(U//~~FOUO~~) Full citations are contained in Appendix A.

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III. (U) FINDINGS

(U//~~FOUO~~) **ALLEGATION:** Did [] engage in conduct that created a hostile work environment, in violation of PMM Chapter 366 or NSA/CSS Policy 1-37?

(U//~~FOUO~~) **CONCLUSION:** Not substantiated.

(U//~~FOUO~~) **ALLEGATION:** Did [] fail to exercise courtesy and respect in dealings with fellow workers, in violation of PMM Chapter 366?

(U//~~FOUO~~) **CONCLUSION:** Substantiated.

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(U) Documentary Evidence

(U//~~FOUO~~) **Appendix C** – Email to Teresa Shea, Director, SID, from [] Former Deputy Chief [] dated 16 April 2014

(U//~~FOUO~~) [] provided this email to the OIG, in which he detailed concerns he had with [] leadership and risk aversion. [] indicated in the email that [] and [] had similar concerns with [] On 28 August 2014, [] told the OIG that the email was mistakenly referred to as a “mutiny” letter by numerous individuals as noted in the testimony below.

(b) (3) – P.L. 86-36

(U) Testimonial Evidence

(b) (3) – P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) []

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 7 August 2014, [] Defense Intelligence Senior Level, [] Technical Director (T/D), was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony.

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(U//FOUO) Since becoming [] Chief in March 2013, [] has fostered an atmosphere of workforce intimidation within []. She does not have self awareness or perceive how she comes across. She has called Program Managers (PMs) at home and screamed at them on more than one occasion. She screamed at [] about his support for [] in front of [] her Deputy, and another colleague, []. She berated him at an extraordinarily high volume for his lack of judgment and then eventually asked to speak to him alone. She then was more somber and told him he was the only person she had any operational respect for; he asked her not to say that, thinking it was not genuine or that, if it was, she was ill-informed. It was the most unprofessional response he has ever witnessed; he subsequently sent her an email asking that they no longer have one-on-one interactions, and told her that he was looking for a job outside [].

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(U//FOUO) [] had a seven minute rant in front of the [] Senior Leadership Team (SLT) a few months ago about the team not speaking with one voice, slamming her fist on the table. She then left the meeting. The team was puzzled by the rant and basically decided it was a "meltdown."

(U//FOUO) Members of the Agency SLT, including [] and Teresa Shea, have made inquiries to [] leaders regarding how things are going at the []. There has been concern that [] is making decisions for SID, for instance, without the appropriate interaction with SID leadership. There is also a debate about how much [] should be doing. There is rumor of a letter about [] that [] sent that made its way to the Deputy Director (D/DIR), which was referred to as a "letter of mutiny" against [] (Appendix C). SLT members and colleagues across the Agency asked [] about the letter, which he has never seen.

(b) (3) - P, L, 86-36

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(U//FOUO) [] thinks that the [] has been too aggressive and needs to be reined in. DIRNSA seems to agree with [].

(U//FOUO) People are afraid to confront [] because she is "connected." She was tightly tied to former DIRNSA, General Keith Alexander, who hired her. [] The perception is that she has been moved along too quickly, and does not have the experience or background to be in a position like [] Chief.

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(U//FOUO) [] consistently wants [] to examine the risk of []. This conservative approach is not always in line with SID thinking and demonstrates that [] does not have an appreciation for how difficult the SIGINT mission is.

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(b) (3) - P, L, 86-36

(U//FOUO) Everything is personal with []. [] has tried to talk to her about her interpersonal deficiencies and how to deal with external partners such as CIA more diplomatically, but she has been consistently defensive. She wants everyone to appreciate and agree with her perspective, regardless of the issue at hand.

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(U//FOUO) Before departing [REDACTED] was counseling people daily, primarily allowing them to vent or helping them deal with [REDACTED]. She has burned relationships with many people.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) On 20 August 2014, Mr. [REDACTED] Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service, Office Chief, [REDACTED] was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] has been in [REDACTED] since November 2013. There is a frustrating and non-productive environment within the [REDACTED] has seen his subordinates, including a veteran GS-15, shaking and afraid to speak in meetings with [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] observed [REDACTED] berate one of his PMs in front of her peers. He apologized to the manager after the meeting, and, since then, he has attended several meetings either in place of or with his people so that he can protect them. [REDACTED] essentially told [REDACTED] Technical Director, that he was "fucking crazy" in another meeting. [REDACTED] confides in [REDACTED] to a point but does not take his guidance or listen to constructive criticism. He is not personally bothered by their interactions but is concerned about the effects on the rest of the workforce.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] makes statements that are not true, such as saying that she spoke to a Senior Executive who wants a certain thing. Other [REDACTED] members have followed up with the same Senior Executive and have received inconsistent information or, in some cases, a refutation. It is difficult to operate when they are always wondering if what she says is true.

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(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] are not happy with [REDACTED] because right now it is backing away from anything that has risk. [REDACTED] may be overreacting [REDACTED] is missing opportunities.

(U//FOUO) There are probably five people working for [REDACTED] who have told him they are ready to leave due to [REDACTED]. Longevity is important in the [REDACTED] due to the need to [REDACTED] berates people in public regularly. It is clear that she has very little trust or respect for the people she works with. Her attitude is "I've worked in industry, you have not." [REDACTED] has a lot of good employees, but [REDACTED] is not recognizing that. [REDACTED] her deputy, is leaving, which has caused concern because he has been dealing with a lot of the workforce's frustration. [REDACTED] reaches down to junior people and initially empowers them, but many of these people are also complaining about working with her.

(U//FOUO) Her style and the fact she is taking no risk and not making decisions are hindering the [REDACTED]. She wants to run every potential opportunity through the DIRNSA or the ODNI. [REDACTED] is pulling back from any sort of [REDACTED]. Ms. Shea, SID Director, told

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[redacted] recently that they need the [redacted] help and said she did not agree with the extremely risk-averse approach.

(U//FOUO)

(U//FOUO) On 13 August 2014, [redacted] GS-13, [redacted] was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony.

(U//FOUO) [redacted] started with [redacted] in June 2012. She has had limited interactions with [redacted] may not be cut out for her role as [redacted] leader. She is not receptive to feedback or open to alternative views or opinions. Her leadership style is causing morale problems. Several people do not agree with the direction the [redacted] is heading, and the lack of openness and healthy dialogue is not well received. [redacted] does not seem to fully understand the [redacted] mission and perhaps the larger Agency mission. [redacted] has been demoralized after listening to [redacted] in town halls. There is an evident lack of sincerity and genuineness in her.

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(U//FOUO) [redacted] has not connected with the [redacted] workforce. She does not seem to understand the effect she has on morale. People are not sure what her motives are at times. Some of her actions have [redacted] If [redacted] was required to have more direct interactions with [redacted] she would probably consider leaving the [redacted]

(U//FOUO)

(U//FOUO) On 25 August 2014, [redacted] Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service, [redacted] was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony.

(U//FOUO) [redacted] who has been in the [redacted] since September 2013, thinks there is valid concern about [redacted] Chief [redacted] "I would say that we work in a hostile work environment...it is widespread." Several times she has ranted and "gone off" on the leadership team, making accusations, without giving specifics: "It's one of you in the room." She also snaps her fingers and pounds on the table regularly.

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(U//FOUO) On at least two occasions, [redacted] has worked with [redacted] employees and then told them not to discuss the interaction with [redacted] or his deputy, [redacted] He has no idea why, and he values differences of opinion, as long as a healthy work environment is maintained. The employees are caught in the middle. She also [redacted] without telling the appropriate PM. There is no transparency in the message she is putting out to the DIRNSA or to SID. She is also not coordinating with SID leadership. She once sent a paper to DIRNSA that appeared to have been fully coordinated with the appropriate Agency players. The paper had [redacted] leaders concerned because it was laid out in a haphazard way. Ms. Shea, SID Director, eventually responded to the DIRNSA that she had not reviewed the paper. The

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DIRNSA told [] and SID to get their act together and come back to him afterwards. Not a day goes by that someone does not complain to him about [].

(U//FOUO) [] is out of place in her position. She is relatively new to the Agency, and she does not have a SIGINT or technical background. There are a lot of subtleties in the work that take time to learn. When the experienced workforce tries to point out things that are right for the mission, she has no trust in them or what they are saying. She also takes things personally.

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(U//FOUO) During one meeting, [] told [] five people had complained about him within the last 24 hours. When he asked her who complained and what the issues were, she did not provide specifics. [] relayed what she said to [] another [] senior. [] who recently left the [] told him she had used the same words with him.

(U//FOUO) Risk has to be considered, [] but if we are too risk averse, the workforce will become people "who only do what I am told to do." Right now, the [] is losing key performers, and, since the word is out on [] it will be difficult to recruit to replace attrition.

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(U//FOUO) [] hates the environment he is exposed to right now. He is looking for another job, and [] told him recently that she wants him to leave, though he is not sure why. She does not need office chiefs because she goes directly to the workforce most of the time.

(U//FOUO) [] very much wants to look good in the eyes of the DIR and D/DIR. She "works up well." Unfortunately, she is not qualified for the [] Chief position, which means the future of the [] is uncertain.

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(U//FOUO) []

(U//FOUO) On 25 August 2014, [] Senior Program Manager, [] was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony.

(U//FOUO) [] GS-15, has been involved in the [] mission since 1998. Right now, there is an unusual environment in []. [] has a trusted circle, mostly younger individuals, to whom she has given a lot of responsibility. A number of the more senior people are not included.

(U//FOUO) [] has a different style than what people are used to. She is driven and passionate and will call out "Why would we do that?" in a meeting. People become uncomfortable in meetings, avoid eye contact, and try to stay under the radar. Others have had "their neck chopped off" in meetings, though [] has seen that with other Agency leaders. She has a "high bar" and if people are not meeting her expectations, either through performance or hours worked, she is quick to write them off. She says things she should not say

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in meetings. [] is not afraid of [] but admits that it is not a bad thing when she does not have to interact with her.

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(U//FOUO) [] became very upset at a meeting with [] and [] and used profanity in addressing him: "Come on people. This [] and we're [] up." [] used an expletive that equates to "messing up." She cuts people off "at their knees" at times too. She recently yelled at [] another [] PM; in a meeting. People came up to [] afterwards and told him they felt bad for him.

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(U//FOUO) She tends to be a "bull in a china shop" in meetings with [] has cultivated relationships with [] over the years but sometimes gets pushed to the side when [] is dealing with [] There have been times when [] is not included when [] meets with [] personnel then ask her why she is not attending the meetings. [] will back brief the PMs at times, but it is not the same as being there with [] She has also visited [] without telling the PMs at all. She wants to move at the pace of industry and has her own agenda; therefore, she does not have time to involve the PMs and other individuals involved with []

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(U//FOUO) Office Chiefs are often left out of the loop. She meets with PMs and other employees without their involvement. She is egocentric and has an "I can do everything" attitude. She takes glory for things, instead of deflecting it to the people. In fairness, she works very hard, puts in extended hours, and cares about the mission.

(U//FOUO) Leaders are looking to move out or waiting for [] to leave. Her style is "my way or the highway." [] has been "warring" with [] who was a Technical Director within [] The two were constantly at odds: "If you brought up [] name associated with something, you were either going to have issues, or she wouldn't even consider it."

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(U//FOUO) Morale in the [] is low, but that is partly attributable to [] and its aftermath. They have to be more conservative than they were before. [] is not a great place to work right now. There was hope that [] was leaving the Agency with former DIRNSA General Alexander, but that did not happen. Now that she is staying, people are down. The other managers and leaders are just going through the paces. [] loves the mission, but she is open to a job change. "I don't know how long I can stay under the radar...it's frustrating to watch people be treated the way they are treated...meetings, you have to be on your tiptoes a bit...please God, just get another leader in here...it's an uncomfortable place to work...."

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(U//FOUO) []

(U//FOUO) On 26 August 2014, [] Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service, Chief [] was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony.

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(U//FOUO) [] was the Deputy Chief, [] from May 2012 until August 2014. [] Chief, [] slammed her fist on the desk and screamed at people on at least two occasions when [] was present. [] told her after both instances that she was a bit harsh. She second guesses people regularly. She has never screamed at [] maybe because he has the respect of the D/DIR and the SID DIR.

(U//FOUO) For the first eight or nine months, the two were generally on the same page. As time went on, it became clear that they had different viewpoints on the role of []. In his view, the [] job is to []. [] was more interested in finding areas where there was []. If an initiative looked like in the end it would embarrass her, it was a bad thing.

(U//FOUO) [] is not capable of running []. She is smart, but she needed to learn how to operate as a deputy for someone before being placed in charge. She is not versed in SIGINT, and the [] mission is much different than []. her last job. The model she had was General Alexander; the DIRNSA could reach down and grab anything or anyone he wanted. [] has acted similarly, often bypassing the managers underneath her. When people push back or challenge her, she gets very frustrated.

(U//FOUO) So many things appear to be personal with []. Meetings such as the [] are very tense; people answer questions as asked, but otherwise do not offer much dialogue or information. The [] is full of creative people who are being stifled.

(U//FOUO) There does not appear to be many people in [] camp. People want to be respected for what they know, and they feel like their knowledge is discounted: "If you're an athlete, you can take a different coach, but if the coach says, 'I don't know how you made it as far as you did,' wow!"

(U//FOUO) In a meeting in June, she went on a rant to the leadership team about having integrity and working as a team. The team had no idea what prompted her yelling.

(U//FOUO) [] went to Ms. Shea and her Deputy in April 2014, and in an email to them expressed his concerns about [] and the [] direction. He subsequently was asked by other Agency seniors about a "mutiny" (Appendix C). [] said his concerns were about [] management deficiencies and how they could be addressed; the email was not an attempt to take over [].

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(U//FOUO) []

(U//FOUO) On 27 August 2014, [] GS-15 [] was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony.

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(U//FOUO) [] has been in the [] for the past seven years. [] recently promoted her to GS-15. She is not surprised to hear there is concern about the atmosphere in the []. Change is difficult, and [] have said to []. It has been a very difficult year or so for [].

(U//FOUO) In November 2013, [] set up an out-of-state meeting with []. She expected [] to establish the agenda, but [] did not realize that until two days before the meeting. The day before the meeting, [] compiled and forwarded an agenda; she then revised the agenda after hearing from []. She tried to meet with [] to discuss the agenda, but her executives said [] was not available. At 2100 hours, [] called [] at home and in an icy tone said: "I want you to tell me why we just sent out the agenda today!" [] tried to explain without throwing the executives under the bus. [] told her she dropped the ball and that was not how they prepare. [] apologized. She was rattled when she hung up the phone and felt worthless and that it was all her fault. She did not sleep at all that night.

(U//FOUO) The next morning at the train station, [] was very unpleasant, saying that she had not received the agenda. [] gave her a hard copy. On the cab ride from the train station to the meeting, [] yelled at [] and her three team members, saying they dropped the ball, that their preparation was sloppy, and that overall, the effort was unacceptable. The three team members had no idea what [] was talking about since [] had not yet relayed the phone conversation with [] from the prior evening. Nothing was gained by her "rant." The meeting with [] actually went okay; [] was poised and socially graceful. "She really is someone to be proud of in front of []." She is very bright and articulate. On the way home, [] explained what happened to the team members, taking full responsibility. It was a rough chapter, and it took her months to recover from the incident. Others have told her they also have been "taken out to the woodshed" by [] so she knows she was not singled out. But she cannot forget it. Despite being promoted, [] is still not at ease with [] fears her wrath, and dreads getting another phone call at home one night. Others share her feelings.

(U//FOUO) She thinks [] has phenomenal strengths, though, and supports a lot of her ideas, to include her establishment of [] to better define priorities. She puts in incredible hours at work, as well.

(U//FOUO) [] weaknesses, such as never acknowledging fault, and stepping over the office chiefs, continue to make her controversial. For instance, with the [] there was little to no role for the office chiefs. She also lacks the SIGINT background that would benefit her in her current position. Despite that, she is pretty choosy about who she listens to. She does not communicate widely or particularly well with the workforce. Moreover, [] knows not to disagree with []. She does not want to hear opposing views. People do not speak up at times because they are fearful of her reaction. Sometimes when people are talking, it is very obvious she is shutting down or does not agree. She writes people off fairly quickly as well. The resultant lack of discussion has led to some issues that could have probably been avoided.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [] would love to coach [] particularly in terms of recognizing and using her cadre of force multipliers. She could be more inclusive and collegial. Her attitude can be: "There's me, and there's the rest of you people." She is extremely bright and very well accomplished. She would be phenomenal, if she could polish the people skills a bit. She is not self aware enough to realize when she offends someone and does not always read people very well.

(U//~~FOUO~~) []

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(U//~~FOUO~~) On 3 September 2014, [] Defense Intelligence Senior Level, Chief, [] was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [] took over from [] as Chief, [] in May 2013. [] had been [] when she ran the [] but the position then moved to the []

(U//~~FOUO~~) Early on, [] and [] made an agreement that they would not fight in public, and thus far they have honored that. At one point, [] and the DIRNSA staff were emailing about the [] absent [] made her aware of it and asked her if she was left off of emails due to "maliciousness or incompetence." [] apologized and the two moved forward. It was difficult wrestling the [] program from [] into her control. But now, [] thinks she has a better relationship with her than others, based on what people have relayed to her. She provided her constructive criticism on one occasion, and [] thanked her for the advice.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) When [] took over the [] the staff was "scared and skittish." They felt tremendous pressure under [] and some had become ill. [] created a sustainable, repeatable process they could follow and made things predictable. The [] staff has been open about liking her approach a lot more. The constant "swirl," last minute actions, unpredictability, and closely held information are all things they do not miss.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Perhaps [] does not understand the core business of NSA. She might be so risk averse due to not being sure of herself. The [] workforce is confused right now as to their mission, specifically whether they are supposed to be involved in [] [] communication is not transparent and inclusive; she is very selective. She tends to want certain answers, and does not respond well when someone tells her what she does not want to hear. She "hop-scotches" all over the place and asks for things at a moment's notice. Collaboration is lacking. Most of the technical workforce does not do well with her style.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) On the other hand, [] is amazingly talented. She can talk to people and brief information smoothly. She would do well as the NSA spokesperson. She had a difficult break in to the Agency because []

the

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[] She has not given a lot of effort in assimilating to the culture or warming to the incumbents. She does not seem to have a lot of people in whom she confides in or trusts.

(U//FOUO)

(U//FOUO) On 3 September 2014, []

GS-15, Liaison, []

[] was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony.

(U//FOUO)

[] has been with [] for seven years. She likes her job, but the atmosphere in the [] has changed. She is not a fan of [] management style, which can be quite harsh.

(U//FOUO)

[] was peripherally involved in an occasion where NSA seniors were performing TDY in a foreign country. The TDY went well. But one afternoon, [] called her down to the office. While waiting for [] she talked to [] Deputy Chief, about the coordination of the TDY. [] was comfortable with what she told him and said [] would probably just ask her for similar information. However, subsequently, [] started "railing" at her, telling her that she had failed to do her job in coordinating with another agency. When she tried to explain, [] would not hear it. [] also told her that she made it clear to [] Chief, [] that [] had failed in her job duties. [] told her she would need to keep a close eye on her and that [] would have to send her regular updates. [] went right to her management after the meeting, telling [] and [] what occurred. Her management supported her actions fully but told her to just drop the matter because she would not get anywhere in trying to fight it. [] did not sleep at all that night. She has never been "taken down" like that in her Agency career. When she subsequently met with [] he told her he was worried that he had "thrown her under the bus" inadvertently when speaking to [] and that, because of his concern, he sent [] an email reassuring her that he felt [] coordination for the TDY was what was needed. [] does not think she did anything wrong concerning the TDY. She avoids interactions with [] now and tries to fly under the radar. "I will not work for her again."

(b) (6)

(U//FOUO)

(U//FOUO) On 4 September 2014 and 27 October 2014, [] Defense Intelligence Senior Level, [] Technical Director for Special Projects, [] was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony.

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(b) (6)

(U//FOUO)

[] has wanted [] to move out of [] for some time and apparently mentioned that to the D/DIR and Ms. Shea, SID Director.

(U//FOUO)

At one time, [] sought counsel from [] among others. He was the first person she ever rated at NSA, and he helped her through it. During the rating discussion, [] cried and said she could only count on two people. []

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thought she meant [redacted] Technical Director and [redacted] She told [redacted] that she learned not to trust anyone with information, because people would undercut her. At some point, [redacted] started compartmenting information excluding certain individuals from leadership team emails, including [redacted]

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) [redacted] set up several [redacted] and subsequently the [redacted] projects were prioritized. [redacted] noticed that his projects were all ranked near the bottom. He voiced concern, to no avail. [redacted] thinks [redacted] is openly "retaliating" against the projects he cares about because of disagreements the two have had. There is a mission deficit right now as a result.

(U//FOUO) After [redacted] manipulated or misrepresented what he had said in one-on-one meetings, [redacted] was reluctant to meet with her without someone else present. In late August or early September, after a staff meeting, [redacted] called him into her office and was "quaking mad, visibly trembling." She told [redacted] that according to the D/DIR, he was not supposed to be in [redacted] any longer, and that he was not to come to any meetings, unless explicitly invited. He recently was sent an email by the [redacted] Deputy COS, saying he had to move his desk due to space constraints and because a colleague returned to the [redacted] from the DNI and needed a desk. [redacted] feels that he was harassed because there were easier ways of working the space shuffle. He is not happy with the performance rating [redacted] recently presented him and not only thinks he was rated lower than he should have been without justification, but also that she did not appropriately adhere to the rating process guidelines.

(b) (6)

(U//FOUO) [redacted] is very secretive and compartmented. She would not even let her [redacted] leadership team see the overview of their mission that she sent to the DIRNSA. If she asks someone to do something and he or she objects, she will cast that person aside. On one recent occasion, personnel from [redacted] said they do not trust her and do not want to deal with her. She can be vicious and mean with [redacted] people as well. He has not felt anyone lied to him at work like [redacted] has.

(U//FOUO) People have told [redacted] he gets under [redacted] skin more than others. He is concerned about retaliation against those associated with him. [redacted] a PM he worked with, had been approved for a promotion by [redacted] going to GS-15; [redacted] removed him from the list and gave the promotion to a female in the [redacted] blames [redacted] for "souring the place" for her. She attributes a letter that [redacted] and [redacted] sent to the D/DIR about her to him, saying he persuaded the four to send it. He does not have "those powers" of persuasion.

(U//FOUO) [redacted]

(U//FOUO) On 3 September 2014, [redacted] GS-14 [redacted] was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony.

(U//FOUO) [redacted] has been in [redacted] and its predecessor since 2003. Hardly a day goes by now without talk about problems in the [redacted] environment. People stop by his desk all the time

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to vent. There is considerable concern about [redacted] leadership and the direction the organization is heading. The culture is now risk averse. Opportunities that were typically right in the [redacted] wheelhouse are not being pursued.

(U//FOUO) There is a tremendous amount of talent and historical background and knowledge among [redacted] leaders and the workforce, but [redacted] does not leverage that and is not receptive to the other leaders. She manages up well, but does not trust people to run [redacted] day-to-day.

(U//FOUO) Many projects on which he works are of interest to [redacted] the Technical Director for Special Projects. She does not like [redacted] and associates [redacted] with him. She does not agree with anything [redacted] does. [redacted] does not like [redacted] either. But [redacted] is heart is more mission-focused. In a recent discussion about a high-risk high reward project, [redacted] told [redacted] that he relied on [redacted] for technical direction for the project. [redacted] responded, "We are not spending any more fucking money on this project," and abruptly left.

(U//FOUO) She has a handful of people whom she consults, because they give her the information she wants. She is not interested in open and honest information. When people give her information she does not want to hear, the information is discounted.

(U//FOUO) About 70% of the people are not happy with how things are going. There will be a happy hour the day she departs. [redacted] is either unaware of the dissatisfaction within the workforce or just does not care. (b) (6)

(U//FOUO) One of [redacted] Traditionally, the [redacted] Chief met with the [redacted] but this year, [redacted] wanted the meeting to be held at NSA W. [redacted] arranged the meeting for four hours in December 2013. She shortened the meeting to 1.5 hours. The meeting was scheduled for 1400-1530 hours; she departed right at 1530 hours, even though the meeting was still going on because she [redacted] who had not been invited to the meeting, had to take over the meeting at 1530. [redacted] was visibly bothered by the fact that she left and did not finish [redacted] especially for the meeting. [redacted] now has a better rapport with [redacted] does. "All the goodwill we had built up, she gave it all away." (b) (6)

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) [redacted]

(U//FOUO) On 8 September 2014, [redacted] GS-15 Project Manager, [redacted] was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony.

(U//FOUO) [redacted] has been with the [redacted] and its predecessor since 2000. In April 2014, [redacted] asked her to replace [redacted] and get to the ground truth on a [redacted] project. [redacted] handled the transition in an unnecessarily awkward and abrupt manner, and

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[redacted] felt like he was fired. After looking into it, [redacted] told [redacted] what was going on with the project. But in a subsequent meeting, [redacted] manipulated the truth, distorting facts and twisting things so that what she communicated was no longer true. [redacted] claimed that [redacted] had not fulfilled agreements and said [redacted] would not move forward until [redacted] delivered. [redacted] said [redacted] delivered on everything agreed upon and told [redacted] that she found nothing to substantiate her claim that they were deficient. [redacted] said: "I said we are not doing this." [redacted] shut down at that point. She felt it was totally leadership by intimidation. She did not feel she could speak her mind any more. [redacted] does not yell, but "it's pretty evident to everyone in the room that she just had you for lunch."

(U//FOUO) [redacted] is not doing its mission any more. "I don't know what our mission is any more to be honest. [redacted] to the detriment of the United States."

(b) (6)

(U//FOUO) Morale is lower than [redacted] has ever seen. Everyone is walking on eggshells. The climate is not healthy. Ninety percent of the workforce is unhappy. [redacted] is bright, but she does not have the level of experience or knowledge to effectively lead. Former DIRNSA General Alexander favored her; she did not earn the [redacted] Chief position.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) [redacted]

(U//FOUO) On 15 September 2014, [redacted] GS-14, [redacted] was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony.

(U//FOUO) [redacted] has been in the [redacted] for the past eight years. There is a lot of tension in the [redacted] workforce. [redacted] has a different management style than what people are used to there, and there is a perception that she does not allow the workforce to do their job.

(U//FOUO) Risk aversion is not the problem, but rather [redacted] inconsistent approach to risk. Decisions she makes are sometimes personality driven; she did not like [redacted] or [redacted] for instance, which affected her judgment. At this point, if [redacted] had the greatest idea in the world, it could not get off the ground.

(U//FOUO) [redacted] has heard stories about [redacted] acting out in meetings but has not personally observed anything inappropriate, despite being in numerous meetings with her. On the surface, [redacted] has a good working relationship with [redacted]. People avoid informing her of certain things because they are afraid of what might happen. He has kept her away from [redacted] because he does not think her involvement would help [redacted]. Purposely keeping things from the boss is not a good model for the more junior individuals in the [redacted].

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(U//FOUO) [] is sometimes disingenuous. She does not seem to trust the leadership below her, which results in an atmosphere of stress. There are a few people in her camp, but a lot of people have given up and at this point are just "filling the seat."

(U//FOUO) [] is not aware of how she is perceived. She would be shocked if she knew what they thought and upset that she is not well liked.

(U//FOUO) It would probably be best if [] moved on although some of the problems are not her fault, "We ([]) are not at our best right now... We could do better."

(U//FOUO) []

(U//FOUO) On 17 September 2014, [] GS-14, [] was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony.

(b) (6)

(U//FOUO) [] has been in [] since 2007. She is the lead for an [] She is not surprised by concerns about the work environment and morale in []. When [] was announced as [] Chief there was immediate angst due to her "horrible reputation." The workforce was concerned about her lack of experience in the Agency and with SIGINT. So [] maybe did not get a "fair shake" when she took over. She had to deal with [] right away, as well.

(U//FOUO) [] alienated people by [] without letting the PM know, and she was not strong in communicating with the [] workforce. She lacks understanding of how the government and the Agency work.

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(U//FOUO) [] does not use the talented leaders who work for her in []. For instance, she personally meets with the [] weekly; Chief [] or the [] T/D would probably be more appropriate for this role. As a result, she does not have time to focus on other things she should be doing. She is very smart and driven and remembers everything. However, her delivery can be off putting, as she tends to say "me, me, me" rather than "us." She is poor at managing down and is also very unpredictable.

(U//FOUO) [] lacks trust in her leadership team, but some of that may be due to the fact that certain leaders are not supporting her fully. There is a "good ol boy" network that has used passive aggressive tactics toward [].

(U//FOUO) [] has been in many meetings with [] but has not seen her act unprofessionally. [] feels she can speak her mind with her.

(U//FOUO) Morale is poor in []. Probably 90% of the people are not happy. Many people are saying they are "waiting [] out," and are slow rolling things that she may not support.

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(U//FOUO) [] is risk averse and conservative, but not to the point that [] is completely handcuffed. She is certainly considering [] before they move on things. People wish [] could be more aggressive.

(U//FOUO) Richard Ledgett, Deputy Director, NSA.

(U//FOUO) On 21 October 2014, Mr. Richard Ledgett, NSA Deputy Director (D/DIR), was interviewed and provided the following information.

(U//FOUO) [] personnel complained to him that under [] the organization was too risk averse. Additionally, concerns were raised regarding [] talking to [] Morale in [] was low during [] tenure.

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(U//FOUO) D/DIR attributed the unhappiness in [] to people not liking the new, more risk-averse direction of [] (which came from DIRNSA and D/DIR) and [] management and leadership style.

(U//FOUO) [] the DIRNSA and D/DIR stressed to [] that political risks had to be emphasized and considered fully [] Initiatives [] are not going to be pursued at this time. NSA must ensure that anything that is questioned by the public is able to be fully explained. There are "cowboys" in the [] who have had difficulty adjusting to the new climate. [] probably exacerbated the problem by not explaining the new emphasis to the workforce; she should have repeatedly communicated that the more conservative approach was consistent with guidance from the DIRNSA. She could have also relayed information and handled situations with more tact and diplomacy. About a month or two ago, D/DIR held a town hall meeting with the [] workforce to explain the direction senior leadership wants [] to take.

(b) (6)

(U//FOUO) [] smartly eliminated several projects that were not productive from an intelligence standpoint and was attempting to ensure that only the most valuable projects were pursued. Her efforts were not always appreciated by those in the [] who had invested time and energy in the discontinued projects.

(U//FOUO) D/DIR was not aware of any complaints that [] harassed or bullied [] personnel. He would be concerned to learn that she engaged in such behavior.

[] was [] that may have affected her work place demeanor.

(U//FOUO) [] recently started a new position [] for the Agency because the position is a good fit for her skills. [] She will supervise three people in the new job. She was not moved because of performance deficiencies or any instances of inappropriate behavior.

(b) (6)

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(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) On 30 October 2014, [REDACTED] GS-13, [REDACTED] was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] thinks those who say [REDACTED] is engaging in harassing or bullying behavior are "fragile and sensitive and need to get over it." [REDACTED] speaks softly and carries a big stick; she has a very powerful message that she conveys succinctly. She is all about professional and personal accountability, and people do not like that sometimes.

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(U//FOUO) Before coming to [REDACTED] heard that people "homestead" there, and she was warned it was a "cesspool of misery and losers, a dead weight environment." She decided to go to [REDACTED] because [REDACTED] was her supervisor and mentor, and she felt like she had "top cover for all my crazy ideas." [REDACTED] was open to a lot of her ideas, which she found refreshing. [REDACTED] like [REDACTED] is "not an NSA insider," and she appreciated how [REDACTED] was questioning the status quo. She was a wake-up call for a lot of people. People were counting the days until she departed; many of those people lack marketable skills and would have a hard time being gainfully employed elsewhere.

(b) (6)

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] has never seen [REDACTED] mistreat anyone, or berate people or call at home. She knew that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] did not get along but thinks they had differing views on how to deal with [REDACTED]. There was a perception that [REDACTED] was the former DIRNSA's pet and that he took care of her - professional jealousy. She thinks [REDACTED] had a tendency to micro-manage, but, given the organization's reputation for slowness and lack of agility, maybe she had to do that. She was quick to judge people's work and their ideas; so perhaps some people did not get appropriate consideration. But, on the other hand, [REDACTED] does have a lot of "whiners."

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] was comfortable expressing disagreement with [REDACTED] and never felt restricted from speaking her mind. She was open to listening to questions and discussion but was ultimately the deciding official. She looked at things from a different perspective and would often respond with challenging, provocative thoughts. She would ask questions that people did not expect as well. She wanted to make sure people thought things through fully and had considered alternatives, given the risk and fiscal climate in which [REDACTED] was operating.

(U//FOUO) Morale is down, due to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. She was a change agent, a disruptive force. People have struggled dealing with changes, such as the [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] created. [REDACTED] correctly identified that [REDACTED] was top heavy; there are divisions there of 20 people. She tried to flatten the organization but was largely unsuccessful.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] never heard [REDACTED] use offensive language in the workplace. She was good at reading people though and knew what buttons to push; so maybe she acted differently with the [REDACTED] SLT.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Generally, the women in the [] responded more favorably to []. Some of the men might have had difficulty accepting and working for a younger, less experienced woman. Things might have been easier for her if she was a man. [] has been marginalized herself as a woman in [].

(U//~~FOUO~~) Overall, [] was a necessary force for change, someone that the [] needed.

(U//~~FOUO~~) []

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(U//~~FOUO~~) On 23 October 2014 and 24 October 2014, [] Defense Intelligence Senior Level, former [] Chief and currently [] for [] the Agency, was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony.

(b) (6)

(U//~~FOUO~~) [] created an open and transparent environment for the [] and, accordingly, does not have concerns about allegations she was engaging in harassing or bullying behavior. She tried to instill accountability for [] which was not always well-received. [] was one individual she had difficulty with. She tried to give him constructive criticism on his performance appraisal last year, but eventually changed the score after [] convinced her he had "top cover" from Ms. Shea and others. [] engaged in bullying and disruptive behavior and would dismiss the concerns when [] approached him with them. [] have had problems with [].

(b) (6)

(U//~~FOUO~~) Morale is low, not only in the [], but across the Agency. The [] environment has been difficult. [] The DIR and D/DIR gave [] clear direction that the [] could not operate as it had before. [] Some people thought this was risk aversion on [] part. Recently, she brought the D/DIR in to speak to the [] SLT and explain NSA's perspective; she should have done so much earlier.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [] is not a yeller. During the long, stressful year, she was frustrated by her Office Chiefs at times, feeling that they were not pulling in the same direction. But she cannot recall any instance of yelling or screaming; she speculated that some people still have problems with younger female managers, including []. Along with [], [] actively worked to undermine her. [] finally went to the D/DIR about [] and he helped her get him out of [].

(U//~~FOUO~~) She does not typically use profanity in the workplace, although she has on rare occasions, when she felt that [] personnel were not prepared for critical meetings. She remembers being frustrated when talking with [] a PM on one of [] projects, although she does not recall using profanity when talking to him.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [] had too many layers to be effective; so [] reached through those layers at times. Office Chiefs were invited to every [] meeting, for instance, but often those

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not to attend. [] Chief, [] told her there was a "cabal," a group of white men that were resistant to [] and did not like the tough changes she was making. The Office Chiefs were passive aggressive in not supporting [] initiatives.

(U//FOUO) People were intimidated by [] and she was told she made people uncomfortable at times when she called on them in meetings. She has an open style. She tried to have brown bags with the workforce for a while, but they were not well attended. Forty percent of the [] workforce had been there for seven years or more; so there was clearly resistance to change. She does not try to operate or get things done through leadership by intimidation, however.

(U//FOUO) On one occasion, [] came directly into the office after a red-eye flight from a meeting where she had been badgered []. In a staff meeting that morning, she remembers thinking "You guys totally don't get it." She might have repeated to the leadership team the profanity [] said to her. After the meeting, she realized how stressed she was and that, in the future, she needed to go home after a trip before coming in and dealing with the workforce. (b) (6)

(U//FOUO) [] felt that she crossed her professional line following a rough TDY when she yelled at [] about a risky project he wanted to pursue. She apologized to him and bought him a coffee afterwards; she felt like she made amends for what was her fault.

(U//FOUO) After the cabal's attempt to remove her from her job, she heard that [] told [] employee [] and others about the "mutiny." In a subsequent meeting, [] emphatically told the leadership team that they needed to keep problems among themselves; she was animated and used her hands when talking but does not think she was unprofessional or on a tirade. She was proud of herself afterwards. She asked [] Technical Director, if she was out of line; and he said that she was fine.

(U//FOUO) When the "cabal" occurred, D/DIR spoke with [] and was satisfied that [] was not the problem. D/DIR called [] and told her he had no concerns.

(U//FOUO) [] treats people with courtesy and respect. Some individuals have never had a female manager before, and some did not appreciate the changes [] had to go through, which may explain why they complained. She wrote personal thank-you notes, gave out letters of appreciation, and always made time for people. She strongly disagrees with the claim that she created a hostile work environment.

(U//FOUO) She is saddened by the complaints to the OIG, which she thinks were orchestrated by []. She now feels intimidated by him. She thinks that many people appreciated her leadership and the work she put forth to preserve NSA's credibility.

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(U//FOUO) About twenty or thirty people signed cards or wrote individual notes to [REDACTED] thanking her when she left [REDACTED]. They cited her leadership, guidance, energy, and devotion to mission. They also thanked her for the opportunities she provided. (b) (6)

(U//FOUO) She has been told that people are intimidated by working with [REDACTED] where communication was looser and profanity was common and certainly accepted. She did not necessarily like that environment and does not see that as her.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) On 24 October 2014, [REDACTED] Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service, Chief, [REDACTED] was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony. (b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] interacted with [REDACTED] as [REDACTED] Chief, [REDACTED] two to three times a month in his current position. He also participates on the Agency SLT with her.

(U//FOUO) According to hearsay, [REDACTED] is a micro-manager, and there were people that wanted to "jump ship" and leave. [REDACTED] has not heard about bullying or harassing behavior and has never observed [REDACTED] acting inappropriately. He would not put much stock into problems she has had with [REDACTED] although technically astute, [REDACTED] has a difficult personality and is hard to manage.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] is assertive and intelligent and has a different approach to things given her private industry experience. At one point, an SLT member suggested that [REDACTED] become [REDACTED] Deputy so that [REDACTED] could teach her how to manage a large organization, since she lacked that experience.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] is right to be asking what value the Agency is getting [REDACTED]. She has been absolutely focused on what the customers, including [REDACTED] find value in and was willing to work with their priorities. (b) (6)

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] was looking to leave the [REDACTED]; so it is not surprising that she was recently moved. The sentiment that she was not a good fit in the [REDACTED] job might have contributed to the move. (b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) On 27 October 2014, [REDACTED] GS-15, former [REDACTED] Executive Assistant, was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] was irritated when she heard there were allegations against [REDACTED] for workforce intimidation and harassing behavior. From the start, there were people who did not like [REDACTED]. There was a "cabal," a secret society that went to the D/DIR to try to get [REDACTED] fired. The group was [REDACTED]

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[] and [] Part of their problem was that they were an "old boys club" and did not like working for a woman. They had some valid complaints, but they should have addressed them with [] instead of going to the D/DIR.

(U//FOUO) There were too many layers in the []; so [] was right in trying to flatten the organization and interacting with the workforce directly. She did reach out to [] directly, but her predecessors in the job did so as well.

(U//FOUO) [] swears very rarely and [] has never seen her do so in a meeting. She hardly ever raises her voice. There was one meeting in which she yelled at [] she was [] and was under a lot of stress. She talks with her hands and sometimes lightly bangs the table when making a point. (b) (6)

(U//FOUO) She called [] once at home, upset that they were not ready for a meeting with [] the following day. That was an isolated incident and not something she typically does. She has never observed harassing or bullying behavior by [] (b) (6)

(U//FOUO) [] (b) (6)

(U//FOUO) On 5 November 2014, [] Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service, Chief, [] was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony. (b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) [] has been with the [] since it was created.

(U//FOUO) [] and [] were unhappy with [] style and expressed concerns about her to the SLT and the D/DIR. The D/DIR contacted [] to ask her view of the concerns. She told him that [] was one of the hardest working people she had ever worked for, that she brought focused skills to the job, and that she was masterful at winnowing in on key issues. She was demanding, striving for more milestones and goals in the [] and attempting to install more rigor and discipline into [] She was committed to the mission, but had less tolerance for a "cowboy" attitude. She was right, and what she was bringing was needed. The culture change was difficult for a lot of people though. People felt the [] was getting risk averse. But the [] climate necessitated this in a lot of cases. [] had supporters who thought she was good for [].

(U//FOUO) [] never saw [] treat anyone unprofessionally. At times, people "poked" at her, but she kept her composure. [] Technical Director, attended a meeting for [] with the [] SLT, in which [] expressed frustration because people were receiving "inside" promotion feedback rather than giving thoughtful feedback and maintaining one voice. [] told [] that [] appeared to be quite frustrated, but he did not think she crossed a line or was out of control.

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(U//FOUO) [] heard that, after [] returned from a flight from the West coast, she had an animated meeting with [] and maybe [] in which [] and [] sharply disagreed. Both parties had heightened emotions, according to hearsay.

(U//FOUO) [] had to reach out to [] [] had a difficult year, with a lot of turmoil, and some of the people involved [] did not have the right skills or know how to react to the difficult political climate. [] was skilled in crisis situations.

(U//FOUO) Morale was not the best in [] given [] the furlough, the need to be careful in terms of risk taking, and the rigor and discipline that [] was trying to implement. Many people were trying to move forward, but there were also a fair number of disgruntled employees. [] communicated to the workforce more than any previous [] Chief, but it was a difficult time. [] was perceived as demanding because she asked hard questions. People griped about her questions but learned from her as well.

(U//FOUO) The Office Chiefs and Deputies were invited to the [] but many chose not to participate. Some lower level people reported directly to [] as a result, but this was not something she orchestrated.

(U//FOUO) There was some group think about [] and the fact that she was young, and not perceived as a true blood SIGINTer. [] could have made some of the same decisions she made without getting as much grief.

(U//FOUO) [] is bright and pushed people to open their thinking. But she was also encouraging and did not hesitate to give kudos to people. She did not purposely try to embarrass people, and [] never observed her engaging in harassing or bullying behavior.

(U//FOUO) []

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) On 29 October 2014, [] Defense Intelligence Senior Level, Technical Director, [] was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony.

(U//FOUO) [] was aggressive when she became [] Chief. She collected information very quickly and made decisions right away. She was always respectful, open minded, and courteous to [] However, in some formal meetings, she could make statements that would sound harsh to others. If people did not explain what they were doing accurately, she would jump to the wrong conclusion, often saying "no" to a potential opportunity.

(U//FOUO) "None of us were prepared for dealing with a new Director, [] quite as inexperienced as [] General Alexander wanted to give her a high position and put her in a

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position that "he didn't really care about....Perhaps they thought people like me could handle [redacted] It was a bad time for the [redacted] and [redacted] was not making it better, but [redacted] approach, although he was "miserable," was to "ride it out." [redacted] was very selective about whom she listened to; [redacted] did not try to offer advice about how to manage [redacted] He stuck closely to his specific role as Technical Director.

(U//FOUO) [redacted] was quite emotional in one meeting with the [redacted] SLT. She was speaking loudly and emphatically regarding unprofessional behavior, although she did not provide specifics or explain who was engaging in the behavior. It was close to a tirade, but not a "meltdown." She might have sworn once or twice during the discussion, but not to the point where [redacted] was bothered by it. Additionally, [redacted] had a bad meeting with [redacted] at one point, although [redacted] did not observe it directly.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) [redacted] was somewhat dismissive of the Office Chiefs and would often reach down in the organization without involving them. She did not understand how to effectively utilize a hierarchical management structure, which hurt [redacted] She would also reach [redacted] without involving program managers. The Office Chiefs broke from [redacted] message pretty early. They did not like taking "abuse" from a woman either. She might have been better accepted if she were a man. At one point, a group of [redacted] leaders [redacted] and [redacted] wanted [redacted] out of the position. The group approached [redacted] about the effort to oust her, but he decided that he was not going to be a part of the "mutiny." He selfishly decided he did not want to leave [redacted] and he did not think the group's chance for success was very good. When asked about [redacted] he told the D/DIR that, although he disliked some of her decisions, she did not cross the line or act illegally or inappropriately at any point. She was risk averse, but that approach was probably necessitated by [redacted] and the wishes of the DIR and D/DIR.

(b) (6)

(U//FOUO) [redacted] took a quick dislike to [redacted] once he determined that he could not manipulate her. She would ask him for specifics and did not like the "fuzziness" of his answers. At a certain point, she treated him inappropriately, taking him off the senior leadership emails and moving his desk. She did not handle him properly and made the problem worse. He plays "unfair" at times too, however. She was a little bit prejudiced against his projects.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) [redacted] did not harass people and, despite a strong will, did not bully individuals. He did hear from [redacted] and [redacted] that they had never "been savaged like that" after a meeting in which [redacted] replaced [redacted] on a project. [redacted] was "practically in tears" after the meeting with [redacted] She should not have taken the two to task for problems she had with [redacted]

(U//FOUO) There was a general fear about briefing [redacted] about a project because of her inexperience and lack of knowledge. As a result, there was a lot of working around her, which put Deputy Chief [redacted] in a difficult position. [redacted] is a smart lady but just did not have the background to build upon, in some cases. When he heard she was leaving, he deliberately tabled some project discussions until after her departure.

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(U//FOUO) [] issues were more management style than overtly offensive behavior. She could use counseling about her approach. At times, her expectations of the workforce were simply too lofty. She was used to seeing NSA at its best, sitting on the 8th floor with the DIRNSA. Towards the end of her time there, it became very difficult to get things done because of [] "We did not accomplish all we could have... It was a miserable time." There was a "well-attended" happy hour when her departure was announced. [] the new Chief, [], has already boosted the organization. He may also be risk averse, but at least he fully understands what the potential opportunities are.

(U//FOUO)

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) On 28 April 2015, [] GS-15 Technical Leader [] was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony.

(U//FOUO) [] has been in [] (and its predecessor) for the past 12 years. He worked with [] on [] while she was still leading []. She is an intelligent woman who presents a favorable image of NSA when meeting with [].

(b) (6)

(U//FOUO) While she was [] Chief, [] liked to have a "solid hand" in operational things of high importance, to the point of micro-management. She showed a lack of respect for organizational boundaries, and would often assign tasks to people that were inconsistent with their job duties. She had an odd, random way of deciding who she wanted to include in things. He was not invited to one meeting that was directly in his lane.

(U//FOUO) [] liked to meet with [] one-on-one to establish rapport, but for some reason, often did not inform the program managers and technical leads of the [] when she did so. Not knowing about her [] visits could make things difficult for those program managers and technical leads.

(U//FOUO) [] was not a big fan of the [] that [] initiated. She gave power and some autonomy to junior people on the [] but tended to ultimately run them herself. The office chiefs were largely excluded from the []. Ultimately, [] was confused by the nebulous purpose of some of the []. It made for a muddled environment." [] the new [] Chief, has given the strategy teams more structure and involved organizational leadership in them.

(U//FOUO) A number of people struggled with [] work philosophy, but [] did not feel there was a hostile work environment in []. On one occasion, he recalled [] using profanity. In a closed door preparatory session for a meeting with [] with [] and possibly [] present, she asked a question and appeared frustrated when she did not receive a clear response. She stated something like: "Look, if we can't fucking explain to these people why we're doing this, then what the hell are we doing?" As they were leaving the meeting, [] remarked to

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

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(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36 [redacted] that he thought what she said was okay given who was in the meeting. He would have felt differently if junior graded people were in the meeting. The remark certainly caught his attention though. [redacted] normally maintains a soft spoken aura, and tries to be polite, almost too much sometimes. The use of profanity was "certainly the exception" and [redacted] cannot recall any other instances in which [redacted] used such language. (9) (a)

(U//FOUO) [redacted] did not agree with [redacted] methodology of reaching down into the organization without going through the chain of command, or the meetings with [redacted] without letting the appropriate [redacted] points of contact know, but he never questioned her desire to do good things for the organization.

(U//FOUO) [redacted] heard about the "mutiny" petition about [redacted] that was sent from several [redacted] seniors to one of the senior leaders of the Agency. The response was basically that she was not going to be moved from [redacted]. [redacted] became aware of the mutiny letter. [redacted] was significantly bothered by the fact that the net effect of [redacted] time at [redacted], whether intentional or not, was that a wealth of talented senior leadership and technical knowledge - [redacted] etc. - left the organization because they could not work with her. [redacted] was decimated. Overall, he would give [redacted] a "D" for her tenure as [redacted] Chief: "We lost a lot of good people." (9) (a)

(U//FOUO) [redacted] did not appreciate [redacted] management style, but did not view [redacted] as a hostile workplace.

(U) Analysis and Conclusions

(U//FOUO) NSA/CSS Policy 1-37 states that all NSA/CSS personnel are responsible for ensuring a harassment-free workplace. NSA/CSS PMM Chapter 366, section 2-1, states that employees will not engage in conduct that creates a hostile work environment, use actions or words that denigrate or show hostility toward an individual for any reason, use abusive or offensive language, or engage in verbal aggression, or disorderly or unusual behavior that disrupts the workplace. NSA/CSS PMM Chapter 366, section 1-3, states that every employee is expected to exercise courtesy and respect in dealings with fellow workers.

(U//FOUO) Several witnesses told the OIG that [redacted] had poor management and leadership skills, did not listen to constructive criticism, took things personally and was defensive, took credit for herself instead of giving it to her people, did not communicate effectively with her staff, reached out to junior personnel, leaving the Office Chiefs out of the loop, excluded individuals from discussions, did not coordinate matters affecting SID with SID leadership, did not have the background or experience in SIGINT or leadership to act as [redacted] Chief, did not appropriately leverage the knowledge and expertise of the [redacted] SLT, despite her inexperience, and was risk averse to the point that [redacted] could not effectively function on [redacted]. While all of the aforementioned, exacerbated by [redacted]

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and a declining [] budget, contributed to the low morale of [], the OIG found the above complaints to be management issues not within the scope of the investigation.

(U//~~FOUO~~) When she was interviewed by the OIG, [] seemed surprised by the allegation that she had engaged in harassing or intimidating behavior. She told the OIG she created an open and transparent environment for [] and that several people within the organization praised her for her leadership and devotion to the job. She said she is not a "yeller," and that although she recognized that some people were intimidated by her, she did not operate or get things done through leadership by intimidation or harassment. She did admit to using profanity on rare occasions when she was frustrated, such as when she felt her team was not prepared for a meeting.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The OIG did not find a preponderance of evidence to substantiate the allegation that [] created or perpetuated a hostile work environment or otherwise violated NSA/CSS PMM Chapter 366, section 2-1. [] employees gave mixed testimony to the OIG about [] workplace behavior. Some cited specific instances when [] screamed at individuals, used profanity, or was harshly critical. Some instances were widely known within [], possibly due to [] position as the Chief. Other witnesses told the OIG [] style was to speak softly and that she maintained a professional tone even when directly challenged. Although witnesses testified that some [] employees were intimidated by [] that reaction seems more attributable to the tough questions she would ask, her unpredictability, her tendency to put people on the spot, and her propensity to react quickly. While [] conduct had a negative impact on the work environment and individuals (e.g., people were sometimes left feeling "savaged" and "practically in tears," shaking and afraid, skittish and scared), it did not rise to the level of creating or perpetuating a hostile work environment or otherwise violating NSA/CSS PMM Chapter 366, section 2-1.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The OIG did find by a preponderance of the evidence, however, at least one incident in which [] did not demonstrate the required courtesy and respect in dealing with fellow workers in violation of PMM Chapter 366, section 1-3.E.

[] testified that [] screamed at him in front of [] and [] and berated him at an extraordinarily high volume. [] confirmed the incident and [] stated that [] told [] he was "fucking crazy" during the meeting. [] told the OIG she used the phrase to refer to a project, not []. [] admitted to the OIG, that, in this instance, she crossed a professional line when she yelled at [] and said she later apologized to him.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Several witnesses, including some who were otherwise critical of her, lauded [] for her work ethic, intelligence, and dedication to mission. Some witnesses also testified that [] job was very difficult and that she was under a great deal of stress. The OIG does not find, however, that this information excuses or mitigates [] misconduct or the negative impact it had on the work environment at [] and the people who worked there.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Given the cited instance, the preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that [REDACTED] on at least occasion, failed to exercise courtesy and respect in dealings with fellow workers, in violation of PMM Chapter 366, section 1-3.E.

(b) (6)

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IV. (U) RESPONSE TO TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 28 May 2015, [REDACTED] responded to the OIG's tentative conclusions. Her response is included as Appendix D.

[REDACTED]
.....
[REDACTED]
(b) (6)

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V. (U) CONCLUSION

(U//~~FOUO~~) The preponderance of the evidence does not support the conclusion that [REDACTED] engaged in harassing or bullying behavior or created a hostile work environment in violation of NSA/CSS PMM Chapter 366 or NSA/CSS Policy 1-37, Annex D. However, on at least one occasion, [REDACTED] failed to exercise courtesy and respect in dealings with fellow workers, in violation of NSA/CSS PMM Chapter 366, section 1-3.E.

(b) (6)

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VI (U) DISTRIBUTION OF RESULTS

(U//~~FOUO~~) A copy of this report of investigation will be provided to Employee Relations (MR). Also, a summary memorandum will be provided to the Associate Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence, Special Actions (Q242), and [redacted] supervisor.

(b) (6)

[redacted]
Senior Investigator

Concurred by:

[redacted]
Assistant Inspector General
for
Investigations

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APPENDIX A

(U) Applicable Authorities

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(U) NSA/CSS PMM, Chapter 366 — *Personal Conduct***Section 1-3 — (U) *General Principles for On-The-Job Conduct***

E. Give thorough, efficient, and industrious service in the performance of assigned duties including presenting oneself for duty in a condition to perform work effectively; exercising courtesy and respect in dealings with fellow workers and the public; and exercising reasonable care in carrying out one's assigned duties.

Section 2-1 — (U) *Work Environment*

Employees will not engage in any conduct that creates a hostile work environment and/or interferes with an individual's work performance.

A. Harassment/Intimidation – Employees will not use actions or words that denigrate or show hostility toward an individual for any reason, but especially because of race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability. Likewise, employees will not use abusive or offensive language, gestures, or other conduct (e.g. display of offensive writings, objects or pictures) directed against other employees that could affect the individual's work performance or impact the work environment.

E. (~~U//FOUO~~) Violence, Threatening Behavior, OR Creating a Disturbance – Employees will not make threats, create a disturbance, engage in threatening behavior or perform acts of violence against Agency persons...This behavior includes physical or verbal aggression, other threatening communications (e.g. writing or gestures,) menacing conduct and disorderly or unusual behavior that disrupts the workplace....”

(U) NSA/CSS Policy 1-37, Annex D: Prohibition of Harassment

1. (~~U//FOUO~~) NSA/CSS shall maintain a work environment free of conduct that interferes with another's individual performance or that creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment. All NSA/CSS personnel are responsible for ensuring a harassment-free workplace.

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APPENDIX B

(U) Employee Profile — 

.....

(b) (6)

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EMPLOYEE PRIVACY ACT

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Employee Profile - Generated 05-JUN-2015

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APPENDIX C

(U) Email to SID Director

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

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From: [REDACTED]
 To: [REDACTED]
 Subject: FW: (U) [REDACTED] Environment
 Date: Thursday, August 28, 2014 12:11:26 PM

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(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

[REDACTED]

As we discussed. If I find others that are relevant I will forward those as well. This one was shared with the DDIR by Teresa Shea.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
 Sent: Wednesday, April 16, 2014 4:18 PM
 To: Shea, Teresa Herman [REDACTED]
 Cc: [REDACTED]
 Subject: (U) [REDACTED] Environment

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Teresa,

Thank you again for all the time you are committing to me. I appreciate it.

You asked for me to capture much of what we have discussed. Below is my attempt to do that.

The operational environment in [REDACTED] this past year has been difficult.

[REDACTED] struggles with delegation – She lacks trust and respect in the talent of direct reports and others. She has said as much to you. As a result the senior personnel and organizational structure are ignored, routinely; to the detriment of the organization.

When she does delegate, she micromanages each task.

We have people who will not volunteer for tasks because those tasks are of interest to [REDACTED]

She has delegated approval of TDYs to the Office Chiefs, but requires a spreadsheet each week of all TDYs and routinely questions their decisions.

[REDACTED] prefers to select talent, not develop it. She hand selects individuals for opportunities and ignores the input of the leadership team. This is quickly noticed by the rest of the workforce. In addition, she tends to quickly put people in good and bad bins, and her view on them is set. She gives feedback to individuals, at exclusion of the team which erodes unity rather quickly within the organization. In addition, she actively pits individuals in [REDACTED] against one another.

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(b) (6)

[] is a classic action offices and the entire [] is treated as a personal staff. Whatever issue is important to her that day is to be the focus of everyone.

She operates independently with partners, without inclusion of the [] leadership or the [] managers. In doing so she has included unwitting personnel at the partner side. We have had partners begin to question their willingness to interact with us based upon her engagement. Her interaction has caused confusion among partners.

She fails to recognize the value of [] is to SID and IAD and not as direct arm of the DIR. The [] should not brief the DIR or DDIR on initiatives that affect SID or IAD without them. In fact, SID or IAD should present the initiative to the DIR or DDIR and we should be a supporting element.

There is an aversion to risk that has bled over into [] She is unilaterally determining that certain risks are []

[] There is a strong feeling that initiatives such as [] would not have been undertaken under [] leadership.

Today there are initiatives that leaders within [] are unwilling to move forward on because they expect the answer they will get will be no or her engagement will put a critical partnership at risk.

We must find a change in our relationship where you as the SIGINT Director get to have some say in the missions we undertake and the ones we do not. I am leery to give up too much authority. But giving [] veto over [] in support of SID is placing too much trust in an individual who has no mission background on which to make that decision.

I am sorry this got beyond pity. I hope it is useful. I am on leave starting tomorrow. [] knows how to get in touch with me should you need to.

v/r,

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PS - should it add credibility to these statements. I reviewed each on with [] and [] Each of them was in agreement and comfortable with their name being attached.

[]

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APPENDIX D

(U) [REDACTED] Response to Tentative Findings

.....

(b) (6)

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Subject: FW: (U) RE: Tentative Conclusions

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2015 10:33 AM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: (U) RE: Tentative Conclusions

(b) (6)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Thanks!

All the best,

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

Thank you for your time.

I strongly disagree with the tentative conclusions of the OIG Inquiry (that I sometimes failed to exercise courtesy and respect in dealings with fellow workers). I will provide my perspective on the complaint to inform the OIG's assessment and also provide my perspective on the two incidents cited, as well. I truly appreciate the opportunity to do so. Thank you.

I firmly believe that I treated everyone with the respect and courtesy they deserved. I attribute the complaints cited to one or more of the following four factors that were at play in [REDACTED] during the time cited in the complaint. First, several individuals who had reputations for not being team players and for "burning bridges" with leadership and peers in prior organizations (as well as, in one case, bullying subordinates) became centralized in [REDACTED] and began working together, egged on by what they perceived as a new more risk-averse posture in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] taking less risk and very carefully reviewing efforts involving [REDACTED] (c) a decision by [REDACTED] to cut [REDACTED] budget by [REDACTED] (due to SID's perception that [REDACTED] was not operational or mission focused and was inward focused and not responsive to mission requirements and needs) and (d) a change in management approach in [REDACTED] - I/we instituted greater transparency and sharing [REDACTED] transparency across [REDACTED] efforts to ensure efforts weren't duplicative). Given the budget changes, I also instituted program reviews for our most costly efforts - several of which had been fostered by the same individuals noted in (a). The four elements led to significant change in [REDACTED]. At all times, I worked hard to be professional, transparent and open. In retrospect, I believe one mistake I made was not to expose the managers and team members sufficiently to the [REDACTED] or the full level of pressure the WH and others were placing on NSA to think about risk - particularly [REDACTED] differently. I preferred to serve as a buffer and shock absorber, which, likely protected the team from having to face some of the realities confronting NSA, and led them to believe I was the source for all the changes happening at once. (I arrived in [REDACTED] three weeks prior to [REDACTED])

I'll provide further background on several of the above factors.

Prior to my taking the job as Chief of [REDACTED], I was told by multiple people that [REDACTED] was a "pit of snakes" where "seniors who can't get along with anyone else go to spend the rest of their careers" and that [REDACTED] badly needed to

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become more operational to deliver on SID's needs. The Chief of SID and Deputy Chief of SID criticized [redacted]'s staff considerably saying they found little value and were cutting the budget [redacted] because [redacted] was useless to mission. They told me they wanted to see change and significant change.

(b) (6)

I arrived with their charge to really change the organization. One of my first priorities was creating a team culture, and lessen the propensity of folks to use information as power, not sharing information about [redacted]. [redacted] I challenged folks to engage with mission and hear what they needed because our jobs were to contribute to the Agency's mission. I worked at all times to be respectful and to listen to folks' views. However, I also held folks accountable. Some people didn't like that. A Deputy Division Chief in [redacted] once commented to me [redacted] your predecessor asked for things and never followed up, so folks didn't bother to do them. You ask and you follow up if it's not delivered. Folks have to adjust to that."

I believe that the complaints on style were reflective, to a great extent on both that change in approach and, to some extent, perhaps, a gender bias, where a woman (and a younger one to boot) who holds people accountable and is direct may be viewed as a challenge. That view was shaped for me by [redacted] (then Chief of [redacted] and the only other woman on the [redacted] SLT with the exception of the Deputy Chief of [redacted] who is very, very quiet), who said that there was a "cabal of men" who were not participating in group discussions and were actively working to undermine my efforts to make [redacted] more mission focused, and more team-focused. Indeed, I find it interesting that the complaint is that I did not include the [redacted] SLT in decisions given that the Chief of [redacted] and [redacted] often didn't attend weekly [redacted] SLT meetings, sending their deputies. The Chief of [redacted] repeatedly skipped SLT meetings to the tune that I asked my deputy, [redacted] to speak to him multiple times to address it. [redacted] had recruited him to [redacted] so I thought he could have a conversation to underscore that his input was needed and valued [redacted] would also be out of the office regularly during our regularly scheduled bi-weekly sync's, sending his deputy in his place.

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(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Several [redacted] SLT members were individuals with difficult reputations and they lived up to them, being repeatedly disruptive, taking discussions off topic and complaining that we were becoming risk averse to friends/peers outside [redacted]. Those individuals tried to have me replaced as the Director of [redacted] in the Winter of 2014, sending emails to the Deputy Director saying I was not competent. When Rick Ledgett looked into it (talking to [redacted] (Chief, [redacted] and others (I believe [redacted] longtime TD), the Deputy Director told me he had no concerns, other than some pointers to repeat messages for folks who needed to hear things many times. [redacted] approached me thereafter, apologized for not addressing "the cabal" sooner and said she had told the Deputy Director that "I can't think of anyone besides [redacted] who could have run [redacted] post [redacted]

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As I noted, at least two members of the [redacted] SLT were known as non-team players and sources of difficulty to prior organizational leaders. One, [redacted] had "burned so many bridges" that SID's head of succession management told me he couldn't find another organization to take him. Indeed, when the current DDIR heard he was on the [redacted] SLT (when [redacted] was one of those who emailed Rick saying I should be removed), he commented, "[redacted] you should have called me before you hired him and I would have told you to stay far away." The DD criticized him - saying he was obnoxious, couldn't work on a team and couldn't take direction from anyone. The second member, [redacted] had been asked to leave his prior organization [redacted] when he tried to have the Chief of [redacted] then [redacted] removed. He also was evicted by the prior chief of [redacted]. Both these individuals cultivated a small team of like-minded individuals in [redacted], which required significant time and effort to manage.

[redacted] in particular, had a reputation for bullying co-workers and subordinates. The TD of [redacted] came to me for support saying [redacted] bullied people repeatedly, and the [redacted] view was that my Deputy protected him. He said everyone was afraid of [redacted] because [redacted] took people down (I believe that is a direct quote, but I may be wrong, so I do not quote it). I spoke to [redacted] and told him his PFP would reflect that and gave him a score in the 80s. At that point, the Chief of SID called me and requested that I raise the score to 93 because [redacted] was helpful to her. Since she sat on the PRB and I didn't, I understood the implication that if I didn't change it, she would. So, I changed it. I found I could not manage [redacted] because of that outside top cover. Indeed, the Director of SID and I finally reached agreement that he would be moved to SID, but the SID +1s pushed back strongly on the SIDDIR's efforts and she could not move [redacted] into SID for almost a year.

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With regard to the specific conclusions, I would note three specific areas which I believe are worthy of modification, for consideration:

1) I believe that the tentative conclusions do not reflect the large number of individuals who sent me emails or notes thanking me for my leadership from within [] or the peers who saw the impact in making [] a more operational and mission-focused organization. For your reference, I will forward an email from the Chief of [] talking about the positive impact we achieved. I would encourage you to talk with [] or [] (Chief of [] as well as [] in her role as Chief of IAD during my time in []) about that impact and/or about the individuals who became centralized in [] and their reputations for being non team players, who consistently cannot work well with their leadership and peers.

2) I provided a large and disparate set of individuals across [] for you to speak with who I believe will support the view that I am a team player, who worked to integrate [], bring people together and give us a unifying vision.

3) With regard to the two incidents you cite, I agree with the first, with minor corrections, and strongly disagree with the second.

For the first, a team member of [] was pushing a very risky project. I had disapproved the project and the individual kept pushing it. He had the SIDDIR call me, saying I was risk averse. When I explained the project to her, she agreed, saying the employee had given her a totally different picture. The individual rounded up multiple people across NSA, telling them I was risk averse. So, I offered to take it to my superior, the Deputy Director, not giving him my view so he could weigh in. I asked the team to write up the project so I could send their description directly to Rick, without any of my own biases. They did. Rick's response was "pure crazy". In the incident cited in the IG report, I had just come off a red eye flight when I'd faced []

[] and was exhausted. I made the mistake of using the phrase because I wanted folks to understand that the ideas was really out of line for NSA, particularly post []. In retrospect, I should not have. I didn't call anyone "fucking crazy". I called the project that they were proposing that []

Following that incident, I felt I had crossed a professional line, and I stopped coming into work off red eyes (since the trips were so brutal in terms of [] I was dealing with), and started going home and coming in at noon.

[So, the way the tentative conclusions framed the two incidents is actually wrong. The quote and red eye flight were the same incident]

The second incident cited is not an accurate characterization. It was after the group of SLT members had tried to get me replaced. I was told that one [] had told some folks across [] about the emails he and others sent. At our regular [] weekly SLT, I told the team that we had an obligation to be professionals. I was disappointed in their lack of professionalism, but I worked hard to meet my own standard. I believed I had been very professional and straight forward. So, on the walk back to my office, I asked the longtime [] TD to see me. I asked whether I had been fully professional and he said I had absolutely been a professional. I would encourage you to verify my account. I didn't "bang the table".

I appreciate your efforts to get an accurate picture and would be happy to provide further detail or discussion, when helpful.

All the best,

[]

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[REDACTED]

Subject:

Response to Tentative Conclusions (cont.)

On 29 May 2015, [REDACTED] added the following to her response to the OIG conclusions:

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[REDACTED]

Thank you for your efforts. Yes, this hasn't been my most fun experience at the Agency ☺.

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I categorically disagree with the characterization of "extraordinarily high volume". I did not yell at a high volume. As a rule, I don't yell.

I was raised with parents who yelled and I, as a matter of practice, don't yell.

So, I completely disagree that it was at an "extraordinarily high volume". I would appreciate my complete disagreement with that statement being noted. Also, there were three people in the room.

There are also two points that were made in the complaint that I find personally offensive because they go against specific operating rules I have for myself.

They are that I was "unpredictable" and that I "took credit for myself". I am a very ordered person - it may be that folks didn't understand the things rocking NSA and [REDACTED] at that time. But, that wasn't my predictability. I also work extraordinarily hard to give credit to my people - highlighting their work (indeed, I sent out weekly notes to [REDACTED] all highlighting individuals who had done great work), so I believe that inclusion is very unfair.

All the best,

[REDACTED]

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From:**Sent:****To:****Subject:**

Tuesday, May 05, 2015 8:43 AM

Tentative Conclusions

Tracking:**Recipient****Delivery****Read**

Delivered: 5/5/2015 8:43 AM

Read: 5/5/2015 9:02 AM

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(b) (6)

This email serves as notification of the tentative conclusions reached in the Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigation into the allegation that you created and perpetuated an atmosphere of workforce intimidation within [redacted]. In accordance with the investigative process, you have the opportunity to comment on the conclusions.

TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS OF OIG INQUIRY

(U//~~FOUO~~) Several witnesses told the OIG that you had poor management and leadership skills; did not listen to constructive criticism; took things personally and were defensive; took credit for yourself instead of giving it to your people; did not communicate effectively with your staff; reached out to junior personnel, leaving the Office Chiefs out of the loop; excluded individuals from discussions; did not coordinate matters affecting SID with SID leadership; did not have the background or experience in SIGINT or leadership to act as [redacted] Chief; did not appropriately leverage the knowledge and expertise of the [redacted] S&F, despite your inexperience; and were risk averse to the point that [redacted] could not effectively function or [redacted]. While all of the aforementioned, exacerbated by [redacted] and a declining [redacted] budget, contributed to the low morale of [redacted], the OIG found the above complaints to be management issues not within the scope of the investigation.

(U//~~FOUO~~) When you were interviewed by the OIG, you seemed surprised by the allegation that you had engaged in harassing or intimidating behavior. You told the OIG you created an open and transparent environment for [redacted] and that several people within the organization praised you for your leadership and devotion to the job. You said you were not a "yeller," and that although you recognized that some people were intimidated by you, you did not operate or get things done through leadership by intimidation or harassment. You did admit to using profanity on rare occasions when frustrated, such as when you felt the team was not prepared for a meeting.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The OIG did not find a preponderance of evidence to substantiate the allegation that you created or perpetuated a hostile work environment or otherwise violated NSA/CSS PMM Chapter 366, section 2-1. Witnesses gave mixed testimony to the OIG about your workplace behavior. Some cited specific instances when you screamed at individuals, used profanity, or were harshly critical. Some instances were widely known, possibly due to your position as the [redacted] Chief. Other witnesses told the OIG your style was to speak softly and that you maintained a professional tone even when directly challenged. Although witnesses testified that some [redacted] employees were intimidated by you, that reaction seems more attributable to the tough questions you would ask, your unpredictability, your tendency to put people on the spot, and your propensity to react quickly. While your conduct had a negative impact on the work environment and individuals (e.g. people were sometimes left feeling "savaged" and "practically in tears," shaking and afraid, skittish and scared), it did not rise to the level of creating or perpetuating a hostile work environment or otherwise violating NSA/CSS PMM Chapter 366, section 2-1.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The OIG did find, however, at least two incidents in which you, by your actions or words, did not demonstrate the required courtesy and respect in dealing with fellow workers:

1. A witness testified that you screamed at him in front of colleagues and berated him at an extraordinarily high volume. The colleagues confirmed the incident and stated that you told the individual he was "fucking crazy" during the meeting. When asked about this incident, you admitted to the OIG that you crossed a professional line.
2. A witness testified that on at least two occasions, one of which was the incident cited above, you slammed your fist on the desk and screamed at people. The second incident, according to the witness, was a "rant" to the [REDACTED] SLT. You admitted that, on one occasion, you came directly into the office after a red-eye flight from a meeting where you [REDACTED] and may have repeated [REDACTED] profanity to the leadership team.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Several witnesses, including some who were otherwise critical of you, lauded you for your work ethic, intelligence, and dedication to mission. Some witnesses also testified that your job was very difficult and that you were under a great deal of stress. The OIG does not find, however, that this information excuses or mitigates your misconduct or the negative impact it had on the work environment at [REDACTED] and the people who worked there.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Given the cited instances, the preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that you sometimes failed to exercise courtesy and respect in dealings with fellow workers, in violation of PMM Chapter 366, section 1-3.E.

As noted above, in accordance with the investigative process, we are giving you the opportunity to comment on the OIG conclusions. Please respond via email by close of business, **Wednesday, 20 May 2015**.

Please call me if you have any questions.

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[REDACTED]
NSA/CSS Office of Inspector General

[REDACTED]
963-2817s

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